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State Estimation under Joint False Data Injection Attacks:
Dealing with Constraints and Insecurity
Wenying Xu, Member, IEEE, Zidong Wang, Fellow, IEEE, Liang Hu, and Jürgen Kurths
Abstract—This paper is concerned with the security issue in the state
estimation problem for a networked control system (NCS). A new model
of joint false data injection (FDI) attack is established wherein attacks are
injected to both the remote estimator and the communication channels.
Such a model is general that includes most existing FDI attack models
as special cases. The joint FDI attacks are subjected to limited access
and/or resource constraints, and this gives rise to a few attack scenarios
to be examined one by one. Our objective is to establish the so-called
insecurity conditions under which there exists an attack sequence capable
of driving the estimation bias to infinity while bypassing the anomaly
detector. By resorting to the generalized inverse theory, necessary and
sufficient conditions are derived for the insecurity under different attack
scenarios. Subsequently, easy-to-implement algorithms are proposed to
generate attack sequences on insecure NCSs with respect to different
attack scenarios. In particular, by using a matrix splitting technique,
the constraint-induced sparsity of the attack vectors is dedicatedly
investigated. Finally, several numerical examples are presented to verify
the effectiveness of the proposed FDI attacks.
Index Terms—False data injection attack, security, joint attacks, state
estimation, resource constraints.
I. INTRODUCTION
For networked control systems (NCSs), the security is always a
major concern as most communication channels, which form the
backbones of NCSs, are vulnerable to cyber-attacks from malicious
adversaries. As a matter of fact, a variety of security risks and threats
have been found in industrial control systems including power grids
[8], [16], [23], nuclear factories [19], and transportation systems [12],
[13]. Typical cyber-attacks on NCSs include denial-of-service (DoS)
attacks and deception attacks, where the DoS attack violates data
availability by blocking data transmission among networked compo-
nents [9], [28], [32], [36], [37], and the deception attack compromises
information integrity through modifying data packets [18], [21], [23],
[25], [39]. Compared with DoS attacks, deception attacks are more
difficult to be detected since they are usually deliberately designed
to bypass the anomaly detector. Two representative deception attacks
are the replay attack [33], [35], [39] and the false data injection (FDI)
attack [18], [20], [23], and the latter is the main focus of this paper.
State estimation problems for NCSs under deception attacks have
been investigated mainly from two different but interrelated perspec-
tives, namely, the defenders and the attackers. For typical defenders,
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they aim to develop estimation methods capable of withstanding
certain types of deception attacks such as randomly occurring at-
tacks [6], [7], [15], [34], unknown but bounded attacks [6], [24],
and energy-constrained attacks [31], [39]. In particular, Bernoulli-
distributed white sequences (with known conditional probabilities)
have been proposed to characterize the success ratio of randomly
occurring attacks in [15], [24].
In theory, a cunning attacker could purposely design the attack
sequence that does not conform to any existing model, thereby
resulting in divergent estimation errors. For instance, it has been
found in [23] that the adversary can bypass the anomaly detector
to deteriorate the estimation performance of power systems through
deliberately launching a stealthy yet malicious attack. In this case,
instead of looking into defenders’ strategies of modeling malicious
attacks under unavoidably strict assumptions, it might make more
practical sense to examine the security problems from the attacker’s
perspective, that is, assess the impact of deception attacks on the
system performance without having to making possibly unrealistic
assumptions. For some representative literature on attacker-based
security problems, we refer the readers to [18], [29], [30], [38].
In terms of an attacker, the attention is focused on analyzing and
assessing how different attacks affect the system performance. For
dynamic NCSs, the impacts of attacks are typically dependent on
where the attack is launched and the kinds of data compromised.
Considering FDI attacks at the communication channels (where the
measurement data is compromised), a computational method has been
provided in [26] to quantify the maximal performance degradation
on dynamic systems, and an insecurity condition has been derived
in [18] for dynamic systems under FDI attacks. On the other hand,
in consideration of the FDI attacks at the estimator (whose contents
could be deleted, modified or corrupted), a necessary and sufficient
condition has been proposed in [27] for the existence of undetectable
attacks. It is worth noting that most existing results along this line
have been based on the single-FDI attack scenario where only one
component (either the communication channels or the estimator) of
the NCS is compromised.
In engineering practice, a networked system consists of many
components (e.g., controllers, estimators, sensors and actuators) con-
nected via shared networks where the information exchanges are con-
ducted via communication channels. Clearly, malicious FDI attacks
could take place on any vulnerable component or communication
channel. Such kind of attacks, referred to as joint-FDI attacks, com-
promises several (more than one) networked components/channels in
a coordinated manner, thereby posing more serious threats to NCSs
than their single-FDI counterparts. Nevertheless, despite its clear
engineering insight, the security problem under joint-FDI attacks has
so far been largely overlooked due probably to the mathematical
complexities induced by the strong couplings of the joint attacks,
and this constitutes one motivation of our current investigation.
Attacks, either on the communication channel or on the estimator,
are inevitably subject to physical constraints. For example, some
critical meters/sensors in power systems are protected against u-
nauthorized physical access [22] and, in this case, only a subset
of meters/sensors are approachable by adversaries. In practice, such
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physical constraints can be formulated as r-specific, that is, the
attacks are only allowed to be launched on r-specific registers of
the channels/estimator due probably to enhanced physical protection
for others. These constraints can also be described in the form of r-
sparsity, that is, at most r registers of the channels/estimator registers
are vulnerable to injected attacks by the adversaries due to limited
energy/resource/capacity [30]. Apparently, all these constraints would
imply sparsity of the attack vector which, in turn, lead to substantial
difficulties in the security research. In fact, together with the joint
attack scenarios, the sparsity of the attack vector constitutes the major
challenge in examining the attacks’ impact on the NCSs.
Stimulated by the discussions made so far, in this paper, we aim
to investigate the impact from a variety of constrained joint-FDI
attacks on the estimation performance of a class of NCSs. Insecurity
conditions, under which there exist undetectable attack sequences
resulting in unbounded estimation bias, are established by virtue of
generalized inverse theory. The contribution of this paper can be
highlighted as fourfold: 1) a rather general joint-FDI attack model
is proposed, for the first time, to characterize the settings where
false data is injected into both the communication channels and the
estimator of the NCS; 2) both the limited access and constrained
resource capacity are taken into special account for the adversary
in order to better reflect the reality of the FDI attacks; 3) necessary
and sufficient conditions for the insecurity are derived for the state
estimation problem of NCSs under various FDI attacks; and 4) easily
implementable algorithms are put forward, by resorting to matrix
splitting techniques, to design attack sequences under different attack
scenarios with specific efforts to tackle the sparsity in constrained
attacks.
Notations: Rn and Rn×m stand for the n-dimensional Euclidean
space and n×m real matrices, respectively. For a matrix M, ‖M‖,
Image(M) and Ker(M) mean the Frobenius norm, the image space
and the kernel space of M , respectively, and M ≻ 0 ( 0) means
that M is positive definite (semi-definite). For a set S ⊆ Rn, the
complement of S is denoted as S , {x ∈ Rn|x /∈ S}. Moreover,
for ∀x ∈ Rn, ‖x‖ denotes its l2 norm, and x is called a k-sparse
vector if it has at most k nonzero elements. Let {x(k)} denote an
infinite sequence of x(1), x(2), · · · , x(k), · · · . Furthermore, I and
O represent, respectively, the identity matrix and zero matrix with
compatible dimension. 1 (or 0) is a vector with all elements being 1
(or 0), and 1sm = [
s−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, · · · , 0, 1, 0, · · · , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
]T .
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we present some preliminaries related to FDI attacks
and NCSs, and then introduce the problem setup.
A. State estimation without attacks
Consider a discrete stochastic linear time-invariant (LTI) physical
plant of the following form:
{
x(k + 1) = Ax(k) + w(k)
y(k) = Cx(k) + v(k)
(1)
where x(k) ∈ Rn and y(k) = [y1(k), · · · , ym(k)]T ∈ Rm are
the system state and the measurement output at time k, respectively;
yi(k) is the measurement of sensor i at time k transmitted over chan-
nel i (i = 1, 2, · · · ,m) (see Fig. 1); the process noise w(k) ∈ Rn and
the measurement noise v(k) ∈ Rm are mutually uncorrelated zero-
mean random signals with covariance matrices Q  0 and R ≻ 0,
respectively; the initial state x(0) is a zero-mean Gaussian random
























Fig. 1. Diagram of state estimation under joint-FDI attacks.
and v(k); and the system matrices A and C are known with the




A Kalman filter is introduced to compute the state estimate x̂(k)
from the measurement output y(k), i.e.,





x̂(k) = x̂(k|k − 1) +Kk(y(k)−Cx̂(k|k − 1)) (4)
Pk = Pk|k−1 −KkCPk|k−1 (5)
with the initial state x̂(0) and the initial value P0. It is well known
that the estimation error covariance of the Kalman filter will converge
to a value if (C,A) is observable and (A,Q
1
2 ) is controllable [3]. In
this paper, we assume that the Kalman filter gain K is operating at a
steady state with , limk→∞ Pk|k−1 and K , PC
T (CPCT +R)−1.
Then, A−KCA is stable [3].
From (2) and (4), it follows that the recursion of x̂(k) satisfies
x̂(k + 1) = Ax̂(k) +K(y(k + 1)− CAx̂(k)) (6)
and the estimation residual z(k + 1) at time k + 1 is given by
z(k + 1) = y(k + 1)− CAx̂(k). (7)
Letting e(k) = x(k)− x̂(k) be the estimation error, we have
e(k + 1) = (A−KCA)e(k) + (In −KC)w(k)−Kv(k + 1).
(8)
Note that system (8) is stable if and only if A−KCA is stable [17].
For the rest of the discussion, the system (8) is assumed to be in a
steady state.
In this paper, a χ2 false-data detector is utilized for the estimator
to diagnose the potential existence of attacks. At time k, the χ2
false-data detector checks whether g(k) > α0 holds or not with a
prescribed threshold α0 and g(k) = zT (k)(CPCT + R)−1z(k). If
g(k) > α0, then an alarm will be triggered, which implies that the
system is under attack, otherwise the system is thought to operate
normally.
B. Joint-FDI attack model
In this subsection, we describe a joint-FDI attack model with false
data injected into both the communication channels and the estimator
(see Fig. 1). Before introducing the attack model, the following
assumptions are made on the malicious adversary.
Assumption 1. The adversary knows the system parameters, i.e., the
matrices A and C.
Assumption 2. The adversary is able to inject a false data sequence
{a(k)} into the estimator register, that is, at time k, the state estimate
x̂(k − 1) can be reset to x̂(k − 1) + a(k) by the adversary.
Assumption 2, adopted from [27], assumes that the adversary is
capable of modifying or corrupting the contents stored in the register
of the estimator.
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Assumption 3. The adversary is able to inject a false data sequence
{b(k)} into the communication channels between the sensors and the
estimator.
1) Joint-FDI attack: The false data a(k) and b(k) are injected into
the estimator and communication channels at time k, respectively.
Under such an attack, the measurement output received by the
estimator is given by
ya(k) = Cx(k) + b(k) + v(k) (9)
and the dynamics of the estimator is given as follows:
{
x̂a(k + 1) = A(x̂a(k) + a(k + 1)) +Kza(k + 1)
za(k + 1) = ya(k + 1) −C[A(x̂a(k) + a(k + 1))]
(10)
where ya(k) ∈ Rm, x̂a(k) ∈ Rn and za(k) ∈ Rm are, respec-
tively, the measurement output, the state estimate and the estimation
residual of system (1) under attack at time k. The vectors a(k) =
[a1(k), · · · , an(k)]
T ∈ Rn and b(k) = [b1(k), · · · , bm(k)]T ∈ Rm
represent the false data injected into the estimator and the channels
at time k, respectively.
Remark 1. In real-world NCSs, it is quite common that several (more
than one) networked components are subject to coordinated attacks
as a result of the advances in intrusion techniques. In (9)-(10), we
adopt two attack vectors a(k) and b(k) to characterize joint-FDI
attacks. In cases of a(k) = 0 or b(k) = 0, the joint-FDI attacks
reduce to the single-FDI ones that have already been discussed in
[18], [26], [27] (see Table I). As such, our joint-FDI model is more
reasonable (yet more general) than those existing single-FDI ones.
Next, by letting b(k) ≡ 0 in joint-FDI attacks, we present a kind
of single-FDI attacks that will be addressed subsequently.
2) Single-FDI attack: The bad data a(k) is injected into the
estimator at time k. Under such an attack, the dynamics of the
estimator (10) becomes
{
x̂a(k + 1) = A (x̂a(k) + a(k + 1)) +Kza(k + 1)
za(k + 1) = y(k + 1)− C[A(x̂a(k) + a(k + 1))].
(11)
In the above model, all communication channels are protected and
the received measurement output is y(k + 1) (rather than ya(k) in
the case of joint-FDI attack).
C. Attack scenarios
In this paper, we consider the case where cyber-attacks can be
launched on both the remote estimator and the communication
channels, and the attacks themselves are subjected to limited access
and/or resource constraints. In terms of the places where the attacks
take place and the access/resource constraints, we have six different
attacks (see Table I) that cover a fairly wide range of scenarios. For
each scenario Si (i = 1, 2, · · · , 6), we formulate the corresponding
attack strategy J(Si) that presents a feasible set for all possible
attack vectors a(k) and b(k). To be specific, the six attack scenarios
include two ideal ones Si (i = 1, 2) and four constrained scenarios
Si (i = 3, 4, 5, 6) (see Table I). The four constrained scenarios can
be described as follows:
• S3: the joint-FDI attack is launched with full access to the esti-
mator but limited access to r specific communication channels;
• S4: the joint-FDI attack is launched with full access to the
estimator but limited resources to compromise up to r commu-
nication channels (out of all the channels), i.e., b(k) is restricted
to a r−sparse vector;
• S5: the single-FDI attack is launched with limited resources
to compromise a subset of the estimator registers, i.e., a(k) is
restricted to a r−sparse vector;
• S6: the joint-FDI attack is launched with limited resources
to compromise a subset of the estimator registers and the
communication channels, i.e., a(k) and b(k) are restricted to
r−sparse vectors.
Remark 2. In reality, malicious attacks are likely to undergo
ineluctable constraints resulting from a number of factors such
as physical protection of the targeted system [22], limited energy
supply for attacks and resource capacity for adversaries [30]. For
this reason, the so-called r−specific vectors a(k) and b(k) (with
r specific elements being 0) are introduced as a true reflection of
limited physical access induced by system protection. Also, a(k) and
b(k) are restricted to r−sparse vectors with aim to characterize the
impact of constrained resource capacity on attacks.
Define the state estimation difference ∆x(k) and the estimation
residual difference ∆z(k) as follows:
∆x(k + 1) , x̂a(k + 1)− x̂(k + 1)
∆z(k + 1) , za(k + 1)− z(k + 1). (12)
Then, we provide the definition of an insecure system.
Definition 1. [18] The system (1) with the state estimator (6) is
said to be insecure in the attack scenario Si (i = 1, · · · , 6) if there
exist attack sequences {a(k), b(k)} ⊆ J(Si) such that the following
two conditions hold simultaneously:




(2) The estimation residual difference ∆z(k) satisfies
‖∆z(k)‖ ≤ α (14)
where α is a prescribed small positive constant scalar.
It is worthwhile to mention that the definition of system security
(i.e. Definition 1) is the same as that of system vulnerability (see [29,
Definition 2]). From Definition 1 and [29, Definition 2]), a system is
secure (or invulnerable) if it is always stable under any attacks that
have bounded influence on the residue, that is, ‖∆z(k)‖ ≤ α.
This paper aims to investigate the impact from a variety of
constrained joint-FDI attacks on the estimation performance of a
class of NCSs. To the best of our knowledge, this problem remains
challenging with the following two substantial difficulties to be
resolved: i) the establishment of necessary and sufficient conditions
(occasionally sufficient conditions only) for the existence of attack
vectors, which are capable of driving the bias in state estimate to
infinity but bypassing the anomaly detector; and ii) the design of
attack sequences under different attack scenarios with specific efforts
to tackle the sparsity in constrained attacks. Therefore, our main tasks
are to deal with these two emerging difficulties.
III. IDEAL ATTACK SCENARIOS
In this section, the ideal attack scenarios S1 for the single-FDI
attack and S2 for the joint-FDI attack are investigated, respectively.
For the convenience of theoretical analysis, we provide the follow-
ing lemmas.
Lemma 1. [10] Let V and W be finite dimensional vector spaces,
and T : V →W is a linear transformation. Then, we have
Rank(T ) + Nullity(T ) = dimV. (15)
Moreover, if T is idempotent, i.e., T 2 = T , then Ker(T ) =
Image(I − T ) where Rank(T ) , dim(Image(T )), Nullity(T ) ,
dim(Ker(T )). Here, the kernel space and the image space are
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TABLE I
SUMMARY OF ATTACK SCENARIOS
Scenario Attack mode Channels Estimator
Ideal S1 single-FDI ×
√
[27], Proposition 1, Corollary 1
Ideal S′1 single-FDI




Constrained S3 joint-FDI r-specific
√
Theorem 2
Constrained S4 joint-FDI r-sparse
√
Theorem 3
Constrained S5 single-FDI × r-sparse Theorem 4
Constrained S6 joint-FDI r-sparse r-sparse Theorem 5
√
full access × no access
defined as Ker(T ) = {v ∈ V : Tv = 0} and Image(T ) =
{Tv : v ∈ V }, respectively.
Lemma 2. [10] For matrices A ∈ Rn×m and B ∈ Rm×r , the fol-
lowing inequality holds: Rank(AB) ≤ min{Rank(A),Rank(B)}.
Definition 2. [10] Given a matrix A ∈ Rn×m, a matrix Ag ∈ Rm×n
is said to be a generalized inverse of A if AAgA = A.
Lemma 3. There exists a matrix T such that TCA = A if and only
if Rank(CA) = Rank(A). Here T = A(CA)g and (CA)g is the
generalized inverse of CA.
Proof: (Sufficiency) By the definition of the generalized
inverse, one has Rank(CA) = Rank(CA(CA)gCA) ≤
Rank((CA)gCA) ≤ Rank(CA). Note that Rank(CA) =
Rank(A), then Rank((CA)gCA) = Rank(A). It follows from
Lemma 1 that Nullity(A) = Nullity((CA)gCA). Then, one
concludes that Ker(A) = Ker((CA)gCA) due to Ker(A) ⊆
Ker((CA)gCA). Let T , (CA)gCA. Obviously, T is idempotent
since T 2 = T. It follows from Lemma 1 that Ker(A) = Ker(T ) =
Image(I−T ), which implies that (I−T )v ∈ Ker(A) for ∀v ∈ Rn.
Because v is arbitrary, we conclude that A(I − T ) = O, namely,
A(CA)gCA = A.
(Necessity) The necessity follows immediately from Rank(A) ≤
Rank(CA) ≤ Rank(A).
A. Single-FDI attack in scenario S1
In the ideal attack scenario S1, the attack has full access to the
estimator only. The corresponding attack strategy J(S1) is given by
J(S1) = {{a(k), b(k)} | a(k) ∈ R
n, b(k) ≡ 0, k ∈ N+}. (16)
The dynamics of ∆x(k+1) and ∆z(k+1) can be obtained from
(11)-(12) as follows:
∆x(k + 1) = (I −KC)A [∆x(k) + a(k + 1)]
∆z(k + 1) = −CA(∆x(k) + a(k + 1)).
(17)
Next, we discuss the necessary and sufficient condition under
which the system (1) with the state estimator (6) is insecure in S1.
Proposition 1. The system (1) with the state estimator (6) is insecure
in the attack scenario S1 if and only if Rank(CA) < Rank(A).
Proof: According to Lemma 1, Rank(CA) < Rank(A) if and
only if Nullity(CA) > Nullity(A). It is worthwhile to mention
that CAη = 0 if Aη = 0 for ∀η ∈ Rn, which implies Ker(A) ⊆
Ker(CA).
(Sufficiency) It follows from Rank(CA) < Rank(A) that
Ker(A) ( Ker(CA). That is, there exists a vector η∗ ∈ Rn that
satisfies η∗ ∈ Ker(CA) but η∗ /∈ Ker(A).
Construct the attack sequence {a(k)} in the following form
a(k) = βkη
∗ − βk−1Aη
∗ (k ≥ 2) (18)
with a(1) = β1η∗ and limk→∞ βk = ∞. Notice that ∆x(0) = 0.
Substituting the attack sequence {a(k)} in (18) into (17), it is not
difficult to see ‖∆z(k)‖ = 0 but ‖∆x(k)‖ = βk‖Aη∗‖ → ∞ as
k → ∞ due to Aη∗ 6= 0. Thus, we conclude that the system (1)
with the state estimator (6) is insecure in the scenario S1 according
to Definition 1.
(Necessity) Let us prove the necessity by contradiction. Suppose
that Rank(CA) ≥ Rank(A), then it follows from Lemma 2 that
Rank(CA) = Rank(A). According to Lemma 3, for ∀η ∈ Rn,
there exists a matrix T ∈ Rn×m such that Aη = TCAη. From
(17), we have ∆x(k + 1) = (I −KC)T∆z(k + 1), which leads to
‖∆x(k+1)‖ ≤ ‖(I −KC)T‖‖∆z(k+1)‖. Then, ‖∆x(k+1)‖ is
bounded if ‖∆z(k + 1)‖ is bounded, and this violates the condition
for the insecurity as stated in Definition 1. The proof is complete.
Corollary 1. If Rank(C) < Rank(A), then system (1) with state
estimator (6) is insecure under the single-FDI attack in S1.
Proof: According to Lemma 2, one has Rank(CA) <
Rank(A), and the proof follows readily from Proposition 1.
Note that Rank(C) < Rank(A) is a sufficient (but not necessary)
condition.
Remark 3. Although the case of the single-FDI attack has already
been discussed in [27], a new easy-to-check necessary and sufficient
condition is derived in Proposition 1. Different from [27], more
general FDI attacks will be discussed subsequently.
B. Joint-FDI attack in scenario S2
A seemingly natural question arises as follows: if the conditions
in Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 do not hold, is it possible for the
adversary to make the system (1) (with the estimator (6)) insecure?
To answer this question, a joint-FID attack is constructed with
a(k) and b(k) injected into the estimator and the communication
channels simultaneously. In this subsection, we consider the ideal
attack scenario S2, where both the estimator and the channels are
fully accessible. The corresponding attack strategy J(S2) is given
by J(S2) = {{a(k), b(k)} | a(k) ∈ Rn, b(k) ∈ Rm, k ∈ N+}.
Obviously, a(k) and b(k) are arbitrary with given dimensions.
Taking (10) and (12) into consideration, we obtain
∆x(k + 1) =(I −KC)A [∆x(k) + a(k + 1)] +Kb(k + 1)
∆z(k + 1) =− CA(∆x(k) + a(k + 1)) + b(k + 1). (19)
Next, let us explore the necessary and sufficient condition under
which the system (1) (with the state estimator (6)) is insecure in S2.
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Theorem 1. The system (1) with the state estimator (6) is insecure
in the attack scenario S2 if and only if A 6= O.
Proof: (Sufficiency) If A 6= O, then there exists a nonzero vector
η ∈ Rn such that Aη 6= 0. The construction procedure of the attack
sequences {a(k)} and {b(k)} is presented in Algorithm 1, i.e.,
b(k) = βkCAη and a(k + 1) = βk+1η − βkAη (20)
where, for k ∈ N+, a(1) = β1η and limk→∞ βk =∞. By noticing
that ∆x(0) = 0, one has ∆x(k) = βkA and ∆z(k) = 0. Obviously,
‖z(k)‖ = 0 ≤ α, but ‖βkAη‖ = βk‖Aη‖ → ∞ as k → ∞ due
to Aη 6= 0. Therefore, the conditions (13)-(14) are satisfied, and we
conclude that the system (1) is insecure under the attacks generated
by Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for the ideal scenario S2
Initialization: Set a(1) = β1η
1: while k ≥ 1 do
2: Set attack b(k) = βkCAη
3: Set attack a(k + 1) = βk+1η − βkAη
4: k ← k + 1
(Necessity) We prove the necessity by contradiction. Suppose that
A = O. Then, (19) is equivalent to ∆x(k + 1) = Kb(k + 1) and
∆z(k+1) = b(k+1), which implies that ‖∆x(k+1)‖ = ‖Kz(k+
1)‖ ≤ ‖K‖‖z(k + 1)‖. As such, it is impossible for (13) and (14)
to be true at the same time. The proof is complete.
Remark 4. A necessary and sufficient condition is established in
Theorem 1, which guarantees the existence of attack sequences that
are capable of driving the estimation bias to infinity but bypassing
the anomaly detector. Specifically, if A 6= O, then the system (1)
with the estimator (6) is insecure, and an implementable procedure
is presented in Algorithm 1 to generate a proper attack sequence. On
the other hand, if the system (1) with the estimator (6) is insecure,
then A 6= O which, in turn, reflects that the system (1) with A = O
is robust to attacks launched in the scenario S2.
Remark 5. It is worthwhile to mention that, compared with single-
FDI attacks discussed in Proposition 1, the joint-FDI attacks pose
more serious threats to the system security due to a relaxed insecure
condition derived in Theorem 1. Specifically, if the system (1) with
the estimator (6) is insecure under the single-FDI attack, then
Rank(CA) < Rank(A) by Proposition 1, which implies that A 6= O
and thus the system (1) is also insecure under the joint-FDI attack.
On the other hand, the system (1) with the estimator (6), which
is insecure under the joint-FDI attack, is not necessarily insecure
under the single-FDI attack, since A 6= O does not always imply
Rank(CA) < Rank(A).
IV. JOINT-FDI ATTACK WITH CONSTRAINTS ON b(k)
Two constrained attack scenarios S3 and S4 for joint-FDI attacks
are discussed in this section.
For the convenience of analysis, we define two index subsets
Irn = {i1, i2, · · · , ir}, J
r
n = {j1, j2, · · · , jn−r}
of the set {1, 2, · · · , n} satisfying
Irn ∩ J
r




n = {1, 2, · · · , n}. (21)
Furthermore, we define two matrices
EIr
n
= [1i1n , 1
i2
n , · · · ,1
ir






n , · · · ,1
j
n−r
n ] ∈ R
n×(n−r), (23)



























A. Constrained scenario S3: limited access to specific communica-
tion channels
There are m communication channels between the sensors and
the estimator. In this subsection, the scenario S3 is first discussed
where m-r (out of m) channels are protected, and only r specific
channels are accessible to the adversary. Without loss of generality,
let Iacc = {s∗1, s
∗
2, · · · , s
∗
r} be the set of indices of the r channels
approachable by the attackers, and let Ipro = {s1, s2, · · · , sm−r}
be the set of indices of the protected channels.
The attack strategy J(S3) with respect to the scenario S3
is given by J(S3) = {{a(k), b(k)} | a(k) ∈ Rn, bi = 0 with
i ∈ Ipro, b(k) ∈ R
m, k ∈ N+
}
. Under this strategy, the output mea-
surement yi(k) (i ∈ Iacc) is possibly manipulated to yi(k) + bi(k)
at instant k, while yj(k) (j ∈ Ipro) can be perfectly transmitted over
channel j.
Note that Iacc ∩ Ipro = ∅ and Iacc ∪ Ipro = {1, 2, · · · , m}.






m , · · · ,1
s∗
r






m , · · · ,1
s
m−r
m ] ∈ R
m×(m−r) with s∗i ∈ Iacc and
si ∈ Ipro.
Theorem 2. The system (1) with the state estimator (6) is insecure in
the attack scenario S3 if and only if Rank(ETproCA) < Rank(A).
Proof: The proof is similar to that of Theorem 3 and is thus
omitted here.
Remark 6. A necessary and sufficient condition is derived in Theo-
rem 2 that reflects what system is insecure in the attack scenario S3.
In addition, if the system (1) with the estimator (6) is insecure, then
Rank(ETproCA) < Rank(A) which implies that, if the condition
Rank(ETproCA) = Rank(A) is satisfied, then the system (1) with
the estimator (6) is robust to the so-called access-constrained joint-
FDI attacks launched in S3. Such a condition could help the system
designer to understand what channels are critical to the system
security and then do the needful to schedule the protection priority.
Remark 7. According to Theorem 2, in case of ETpro = I (or E
T
pro =
O), the so-called access-constrained joint-FDI attack becomes the
full-access single-FDI one (or joint-FDI one) that has been discussed
in Proposition 1 (or Theorem 1). As such, Proposition 1 and Theorem
1 can be regarded as special cases of Theorem 2.
B. Constrained scenario S4: limited available resources for compro-
mising communication channels
In this subsection, we further consider the scenario S4, where the
attack has the limited resource capacity for compromising up to r
channels (out of all the channels). Note that here is no restriction on
what channels are protected in S4 (as opposed to the case of S3). In
other words, any r channels (out of m channels) are accessible to
the adversary.
The attack strategy J(S4) with respect to the scenario S4 is
given by J(S4) = {{a(k), b(k)} | b(k) ∈ Rm is a r-sparse vector,
a(k) ∈ Rn, k ∈ N+
}
.
Theorem 3. The system (1) with the state estimator (6) is insecure in
the attack scenario S4 if and only if there exist two index sets Irm,J
r
m
with properties in (21) such that Rank(ETJ r
m
CA) < Rank(A).
Proof: According to Lemma 1, Rank(ETJ r
m
CA) < Rank(A) if
and only if Nullity(ETJ r
m
CA) > Nullity(A). Note that ETJ r
m
CAξ =
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(Sufficiency) If Rank(ETJ r
m
CA) < Rank(A), then Ker(A) (
Ker(ETJ r
m
CA). That is, there exists a vector ξ∗ ∈ Rn that satisfies
ξ∗ ∈ Ker(ETJr
m
CA) but ξ∗ /∈ Ker(A), namely, ETJ r
m
CAξ∗ = 0 but
Aξ∗ 6= 0.
The construction procedure of {a(k), b(k)} is displayed in Algo-
rithm 2 with limk→∞ βk =∞. Next, we will illustrate that (i) b(k)
is a r-sparse vector, and (ii) the system (1) is insecure under the
attack sequences {a(k), b(k)}.
First, b(k) is a r-sparse vector due to ETIr
m
CAξ∗ ∈ Rr. Second,
noting that ∆x(0) = 0, it follows from Algorithm 2 that ∆x(k+1) =
βk+1Aξ


















Owing to ETJ r
m
CAξ∗ = 0, we have ∆z(k) = 0 and ‖∆x(k)‖ =
βk‖Aξ
∗‖ → ∞ as k → ∞ due to Aξ∗ 6= 0. It follows from
Definition 1 that the system (1) with the estimator (6) is insecure.
Algorithm 2 Algorithm for the scenario S4
Initialization: Set a(1) = β1ξ∗
1: while k ≥ 1 do





3: Set attack a(k + 1) = βk+1ξ∗ − βkAξ∗
4: k ← k + 1
(Necessity) We prove the necessity by contradiction. Suppose
that, for any partition Irm = {i1, i2, · · · , ir} and J
r
m =
{j1, j2, · · · , jm−r}, one has Rank(ETJ r
m




Due to {a(k), b(k)} ⊆ J(S4), b(k) is a r-sparse vector, that is,
∃v(k) ∈ Rr such that b(k) = EIr
m
v(k). From (19), ∆z(k + 1) =
−CA(∆x(k) + a(k + 1)) + b(k + 1), which implies that
ETJ r
m
∆z(k + 1) = −ETJ r
m





= O in (24). Noting that Rank(ETJ r
m
CA) =
Rank(A), according to Lemma 3, there exists a matrix T such that
TETJr
m
CAξ = Aξ for ∀ξ ∈ Rn.




it follows from (26) that ∆x(k+1) = −(TETJr
m
+K)∆z(k+1) and






‖∆z(k + 1)‖. This implies
that ‖∆x(k + 1)‖ is bounded if ‖∆z(k + 1)‖ is bounded, and the
condition in the definition of insecurity is violated. The proof is now
complete.
Note that the proof of Theorem 3 is applicable to Theorem 2 by
choosing Irm = Iacc and J
r
m = Ipro with Iacc and Ipro given in
Theorem 2.
Remark 8. To cope with the difficulties caused by the sparsity of
the vector b(k), a matrix splitting technique is utilized in Theorems









to design appropriate sparse attack vectors.
Remark 9. It can be observed from Proposition 1 and Theorems
1-3 that four different insecurity conditions under the scenarios Si
(i = 1, 2, 3, 4) are derived in the form of necessary and sufficient
conditions. The sufficiency reveals the system insecurity (vulnerabil-
ity) under attacks, and the necessity reflects the system robustness
against attacks.
V. FDI ATTACKS WITH CONSTRAINTS ON a(k) AND b(k)
In this section, we further consider two challenging yet practical
scenarios S5 and S6, where the constraint on a(k) is taken into






















defined in (25). Similar to Section III, we first
discuss the case of single-FDI attacks.
A. Single-FDI attack in scenario S5
In this subsection, we focus on the scenario S5 where the
single-FDI attack is launched with limited resource capacity.
The corresponding attack strategy J(S5) is given by J(S5) =




Theorem 4. The system (1) with estimator (6) is insecure in the
attack scenario S5 if there exist two index sets Irn and J
r
n with
properties in (21) satisfying
Ker(C1A1) ∩Ker(A2) ∩Ker(A1) 6= ∅. (28)
Proof: First, we assume that ξ ∈ Rr, ξ ∈ Ker(C1A1) ∩
Ker(A2) ∩ Ker(A1) which implies that C1A1ξ = 0, A2ξ = 0 and
A1ξ 6= 0.
Algorithm 3 Algorithm for the scenario S5
Initialization: Set a(1) = β1EIr
n
ξ
1: while k ≥ 1 do





3: k ← k + 1
In Algorithm 3, a(k) is a r-sparse vector due to ξ and A1ξ ∈ Rr.
Noticing that ∆x(0) = 0, it follows from Algorithm 3 and (17) that
∆z(k) = 0 and ∆x(k) = βkEIr
n
A1ξ (k ∈ N
+) with limk→∞ βk =
∞. It can be concluded that ‖∆x(k)‖ → ∞ and ‖∆z(k)‖ = 0 ≤ α
as k → ∞ due to A1ξ 6= 0. According to Definition 1, the system
(1) with the estimator (6) is insecure.
B. Joint-FDI attack in scenario S6
This subsection discusses the scenario S6 where general resource-
constrained joint-FDI attacks are analyzed with a(k) and b(k)
subjected to constraints. The corresponding attack strategy J(S6) is
given by J(S6) = {(a(k), b(k))| both a(k) ∈ Rn and b(k) ∈ Rm
are confined to r-sparse vectors, k ∈ N+
}















2, · · · , j
′
m−r} satisfying









Theorem 5. The system (1) with estimator (6) is insecure in the







satisfying properties in (21) such that
Ker(C̃2A1) ∩Ker(A2) ∩Ker(A1) 6= ∅ (29)
with A1 and A2 defined in (27).
Proof: First, assume that ξ′ ∈ Rr , ξ′ ∈ Ker(C̃2A1)∩Ker(A2)∩
Ker(A1), which implies that A1ξ′ 6= 0, A2ξ′ = 0 and C̃2A1ξ′ = 0.
The construction procedure of {a(k), b(k)} is presented in Algorithm
4 with limk→∞ βk = ∞. Due to ξ′, A1ξ′ and C̃1A1ξ′ ∈ Rr, a(k)
and b(k) are r-sparse vectors and {a(k), b(k)} ⊆ J(S6).




′ and ∆z(k) = 0. As such, we have ‖∆z(k)‖ ≡ 0 but
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Algorithm 4 Algorithm for the scenario S6
Initialization: Set a(1) = β1EIr
n
ξ′
1: while k ≥ 1 do










4: k ← k + 1
‖∆x(k)‖ → ∞ as k → ∞, and the insecurity conditions (13)-(14)
are satisfied.
The insecurity conditions proposed in Theorems 4-5 are sufficient
but not necessary. The conditions in Theorem 5 are more relaxed
than those in Theorem 4 due to Ker(C1A1) ⊆ Ker(C̃2A1). Such
relaxed conditions reveal that the system is more vulnerable to joint-
FDI attacks as compared with single-FDI attacks.
Remark 10. The joint effect from sparsity of attack vectors a(k) and
b(k) gives rise to the main difficulty in the analysis and design of
joint-FDI attacks in the scenario S6, and such a difficulty has been
specifically tackled by using a dedicated matrix splitting method. If









satisfying (29), then an explicit attack algorithm is established in
Algorithm 4 to generate proper sparse attack vectors capable of
driving the estimation bias to infinity but bypassing the anomaly
detector.
Remark 11. It is worthwhile to mention that the scenario S6
is general and includes other possible constrained scenarios (that
are not considered in this paper) as special cases. For example,
one possible scenario is the joint-FDI attack with full access to
the communication channels but limited resources to compromise a
subset of the estimator registers. In this scenario, the corresponding
insecurity condition can be derived by letting I′rm = {1, 2, · · · ,m}
and J ′rm = ∅ in Theorem 5.
Remark 12. So far, the security issue has been extensively inves-
tigated in the literature for the state estimation problems of NCSs
under various deception attacks, and most results have been reported
from the defenders’ perspective, that is, design certain algorithms
to resist malicious attacks that are assumed to be of certain types
according to the historical knowledge. This paper takes a different
angle to look into the insecurity issue by quantifying how different
FDI attacks compromise the estimation performance. Compared to
existing literature, our main results exhibit the following distinctive
features: 1) the proposed joint-FDI attack model is new, which is
general to cover the case where the FDI attacks take place at both
the communication channels and the estimator of the NCS; 2) the
considered physical constraints are new that reflect the limited access
as well as the resource capacity, and such constraints play a crucial
role in degrading the system performance; 3) several new conditions
(mostly necessary and sufficient) are established to characterize the
insecurity of the system under attacks; and 4) a set of new algorithms
are designed to construct the attack sequences where the sparsity in
constrained attacks is specifically handled.
VI. SIMULATION
Consider a discrete-time LTI system (1) with four communication
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Fig. 2. The evolution of ‖∆x(k)‖ and ‖za(k)‖ under the joint-FDI attack
in the scenario S2.
C = I4, Q = 0.01I4 and R = 0.1I3. Then, we analyze joint-FDI
attacks in different attack scenarios with different attack sequences
{a(k), b(k)}.
Ideal Scenario S2: In the scenario S2, the attacker has ac-
cess to all four channels. According to Algorithm 1, we let
b(k) = k[0,−0.0001,−0.0393, 0.0393]T (k ∈ N+), a(k) =
kη∗ − (k − 1)Aη∗ (k ≥ 2) with a(1) = η∗ and η∗ =
[−0.4713,−0.1439,−0.8666, 0.0785]T ∈ Ker(CA). Under the
joint-FDI attack, the estimation difference ‖∆x(k)‖ goes to infinity,
but the estimation residual za(k) retains the same statistical properties
with z(k) (see Fig. 2).
Constrained Scenarios: Three attack scenarios S3, S4 and S6 for
joint-FDI attacks are discussed.
Case 1: We consider the scenario S3 where channels 2 and 4 are
under protection, and only channels 1 and 3 are accessible to the
attack. In this case, the attack sequences {a(k), b(k)} (k ∈ N+)
are generated by a(k) = kη∗1 − (k − 1)Aη
∗
1 (k ≥ 2) with
a(1) = η∗1 and η
∗
1 = [−0.0311,−0.0751,−0.9967, 0]
T , and
b(k) = k[0.4069, 0,−0.0615, 0]T .
Case 2: We consider the scenario S4 where the attack has
limited resources for compromising only one but one (out of
four) channel(s). In this case, channel 4 is attacked and the cor-
responding attack sequences {a(k), b(k)} (k ∈ N+) are gener-
ated by a(k) = kη∗2 − (k − 1)Aη
∗
2 (k ≥ 2) with a(1) =
η∗2 and η
∗
2 = [0.5906, 0.3018, 0.7064,−0.2471]
T , and b(k) =
k[0, 0, 0,−0.1236]T
Case 3: We consider the scenario S6 and the attack vectors a(k)
and b(k) are confined to 3-sparse vectors. In this case, the attack
sequences {a(k), b(k)} (k ∈ N+) are generated by Algorithm 4
with ξ′ = [1, 1, 1]T ∈ R3 and βk = k ∈ N+.
It can be observed from Fig. 3 that, in the above three cases, the
generated attack sequences have indeed driven the state estimation
difference ‖∆x(k)‖ to infinity with different rates while successfully
evading the detection by the deployed false-data detector.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the security issue has been thoroughly investigated
in the state estimation problems for NCSs. A novel joint-FDI attack
model has been proposed to depict the situation where the false data
are injected into the registers of both the communication channels and
the estimator. Both limited access and resource capacity constraints
have been taken into consideration in the framework of FDI attacks.
Necessary and sufficient conditions for the insecurity of the system
under different attack scenarios have been derived for the existence of
malicious attack sequences that are capable of leading to unbounded
estimation errors but bypassing the anomaly detector. Subsequently,
implementable attack algorithms have been proposed to generate
attack sequences over insecure NCSs for each attack scenario by
resorting to the matrix splitting technique. Finally, some numerical
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Fig. 3. The evolution of ‖∆x(k)‖ and ‖za(k)‖ under the joint-FDI attacks
in three constrained attack scenarios. That is, case 1: the scenario S3 with
channels 1 and 3 being attacked; case 2: the scenario S4 with only channel
4 being attacked; and case 3: the scenario S6 with 3-sparse vectors a(k) and
b(k).
examples have been presented to verify the effectiveness of the
proposed FDI attacks. Our future research topics would include 1) the
security issue in the optimal control [3], [27]; 2) insecurity conditions
for unsteady Kalman filters [14]; and 3) the security issue in the state
estimation problem for more general systems (such as nonlinear or
linear time-varying systems and wireless sensor networks) by using
more sophisticated filtering algorithms [1], [2], [4], [5], [11], [14]
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